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The courts, however, should
an anticipatory assignment of income."
never go so far as to use the "substitution" theory of the Lake case to
deny an effective gift or capital gains treatment to the conveyance of the
entire or vertical slice of a royalty interest."' In fact, a strong argument
can be made that the application of the Lake case should not be extended
into the area of lease bonus conveyances. It would appear to be somewhat of an anomaly if the Commissioner and the courts maintain their
present position that conveyance of the entire or vertical-slice of a royalty
with a retained lease bonus is not a carve-out, but a capital transaction;
and still tax the conveyance of the entire or a proportionate interest in a
lease bonus, with or without a retained royalty, as an anticipatory assignment of income, under the authority of the Lake case. In either instance,
the result is the conversion into capital gain of what would be received as
ordinary income at a future time; in both instances, a separate depletable
interest, a property, not a carve-out, is conveyed.

MECHANICS LIENS IN INDIANA-THE EXTENT OF THE
PROPERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS SUBJECT
TO THE LIEN
The mechanic's lien is a security device to insure the mechanic or
materialman the debt owed for work performed or materials furnished
for the erection, improvement, or repair of buildings or other structures
on real property. The right of the mechanic or materialman to such a
lien was a remedy unknown to the common law, and exists today only by
virtue of statute.'
These statutes first appeared in the United States at the beginning
of the 19th century.2 Their origin is traced by some to the need for a
simple and effective debt remedy in a growing nation which emphasized
mechanical and industrial pursuits.3 For the first one hundred years of
this new remedy's existence a great amount of attention was given it by
both legal writers and state legislatures. Since the turn of this century,
however, very little has been written on mechanic's liens. This note is
93. But cf., Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 31 T.C. 971 (1959), acq., 1959-2 Cuu. BULL.
6, rev'd on other grounds, 282 F 2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
94. See Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is" of Oil and Gas Taxation, 73 HARV. L. RaV.
1441, 1505-06 (1960).
1. See, e.g., National Brick Co. v. Russel, 99 Ind. App. 53, 190 N.E. 614 (1934).
2. PHILIPS, MECHANiCS' LIEN S § 1-12 (3d ed. 1893).
3. Id. § 6.

NOTES
an attempt to discuss and evaluate portions of the Indiana mechanic's
lien statute.
The current Indiana statute was enacted in 1909, and the portions
with which this note is concerned are sections 43-701 and 43-702.1 Section 43-701 states:
Persons entitled to lien-Contractors and laborers-Posting
of notice.-Contractors, subcontractors, mechanics, journeymen, laborers and all persons performing labor or furnishing
materials or machinery for the erection, altering, repairing or
removing any house, mill, manufactory, or other building,
bridge, reservoir, system of water-works, or other structures,
or for construction, altering, repairing, or removing any walk
or sidewalk, whether such walk or sidewalk be on the land or
bordering thereon, stile, well, drain, drainage ditch, sewer or
cistern may have a lien separately or jointly upon the house,
mill, manufactury or other building, bridge, reservoir, system
of waterworks or other structure, sidewalk, walk, stile, well,
drain, drainage ditch, sewer or cistern which they may have
erected, altered, repaired or removed or for which they may
have furnished materials or machinery of any description, and,
on the interest of the owner of the lot or parcel of land on
which it stands or with which it is connected to the extent of
the value of any labor done, material furnished or either; and
all claims for wages for mechanics and laborers employed in or
about any shop, mill, wareroom, storeroom, manufacture or
structure, bridge, reservoir, system of water works or other
structure, sidewalk, walk, stile, well, drain, drainage ditch or
cistern shall be a lien on all the machinery, tools, stock of material, work finished or unfinished, located in or about such
shop, mill, wareroom, storeroom, manufactory or other building, bridge, reservoir, system of water-works, or other structure, sidewalks, walk, stile, wall, drain, drainage ditch, sewer,
or cistern or used in the business thereof; and should the person, firm, or corporation be in failing circumstances the abovementioned claims shall be preferred debts whether claims or
notice of lien has been filed or not .
Section 43-702 states:
Extent of lien-The entire land upon which any such build4.

IND. ANN. STAT.
ANN. STAT.

5. IND.

§§ 43-701, 43-702 (Burns 1952).
§ 43-701 (Bums 1952).
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ing, erection or other improvement is situated, including that
portion not covered therewith, shall be subject to lien to the
extent of all the right, title, and interest owned therein by the
owner thereof, for whose immediate use or benefit such labor
was done or material furnished; and where the owner has only
a leasehold interest, or the land is encumbered by mortgage,
the lien, so far as concerns the buildings erected by said lienholder, is not impaired by forfeiture of the lease for rent or
foreclosure of mortgage; but the same may be sold to satisfy
the lien and be removed within ninety (90) days after the
sale by the purchaser.'
To interpret these sections properly, attention must also be given
to the earlier statute of 1883,' and its predecessor enacted in 1953. The
6.

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 43-702 (Burns 1952).

7. Ind. Laws 1883, ch. CXV, §§ 1-2 at 140, as amended, Ind. Laws 1889, ch.

CXXIII, §§ 1-2 at 257:
Mechanic's Liens-1. That contractors, sub-contractors, mechanics, journeymen, laborers and all other persons performing labor or furnishing materials or
machinery for the erection, altering, repairing or removing any house, mill,
manufactory, or other building, bridge, reservoir, system of water works or
other structure, or for constructing, altering or repairing or removing of any
sidewalk, walk, stile, well, drain, sewer or cistern may have a lien separately or
jointly upon the house, mill, manufactory or other building, bridge, reservoir,
system of waterworks or other structure, sidewalk, walk, stile, well, drain,
sewer or cistern which they may have erected, altered, repaired or removed,
or for which they may have furnished material or machinery of any description,
and on the interest of the owner of the lot or parcel of land on which it stands
or with which it is connected to the extent of the value of any labor done,
material furnished, or either; and all claims for wages for mechanics and
laborers employed in or about any shop, mill, ware-room, storeroom, manufactory, or structure, bridge, reservoir, system of waterworks or other structure,
sidewalk, walk, stile, well, drain, sewer or cistern, shall be a first lien on all
machinery, tools, stock of material, work finished or unfinished located in or
about such shop, mill, ware-room, storeroom, manufactory or other building,
bridge, reservoir, system of waterworks or other structure, sidewalk, walk, stile,
well, drain, sewer or cistern or used in the business thereof; and should the
person, firm or corporation be in failing circumstances the above mentioned
claim shall be preferred debts, whether claim or notice of lien has been filed
or not.
Extent of Lien-2. The entire land upon which any such building, erection
or improvement is situated, including that portion not covered therewith shall
be subject to lien to the extent of all right, title, and interest owned therein by
the owner thereof, for whose immediate use or benefit such labor was done
or material furnished; and where the owner has only a leasehold interest or
the land is encumbered by mortgage, the lien, so far as concerns the buildings
erected by said lien-holder, is not impaired by forfeiture of the lease for rent
or foreclosure of the mortgage; but the same shall be sold to satisfy the lien
and be removed within 90 days after the sale by the purchaser.
8. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, part second, ch. 1 §§ 647-48 at 181:
Mechanic's Liens on buildings: Mechanics, and all persons performing labor
or repair of any building, or who may have furnished any engine or other
machinery for any mill, distillery, or other manufactory, may have a lien separ-
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current statute and the 1883 statute are very similar in nature (especially the sections with which this note is concerned), and generally, judicial decisions rendered under the 1883 statute are valid law today. This
is not so true of the 1853 statute which differs greatly from both
the 1883 and 1909 statutes. In many instances, however, emphasis
is given to the judicial construction of this century-old statute so
it cannot be properly omitted from a discussion of mechanic's liens.
Although Indiana has had mechanic's lien statutes for over one hundred years, there remain problem areas which have not been adequately
settled, and where an error by the prospective lienor could easily cost
him the benefits of this simple and inexpensive remedy. Only two of
these areas will be discussed here. Part I is concerned with the property
interest to which a mechanic's lien may attach. Part II is a discussion of
the extent of real estate which may be attached by a mechanic's lien.
I
THE PROPERTY INTEREST TO WHICH A MECHANIC'S
LIEN MAY ATTACH
Under the standard meclanic's lien fact pattern, few problems arise.
Labor or materials are furnished for the erection, improvement, or repair of a structure, a mechanic's lien is filed, the debt is not paid, and the
lienor brings an action to foreclose the lien and have the land sold to satisfy the debt. A more difficult situation may arise, however, when the
person who contracts for the labor or materials is not the fee simple
owner of the land. This person may be on the land as a lessee, by virtue
of a life estate, or he may be one of several co-tenants, or even a mere
vendee in possession. The question is one of ascertaining whose property
interest may be attached as security for the debt owed to the mechanic
or materialman. The choices and problems may be as varied as the possible divisions of interest in real property.
The Indiana mechanic's lien statute does not mention any particular
property interest to which a mechanic's lien must attach. Under Section
ately or jointly upon the building which they may have constructed or repaired
or upon any buildings, mill, distillery, or other manufactory for which they may
have furnished materials of any description, and on the interest of the owner in
the lot or land on which it stands, to the extent of the value of any labor done
or materials furnished, or for both.
Extent of Lien: The provisions of this Act shall only extend to work done
or materials furnished on new buildings, or to a contract entered into with
the owner of any buildings for repairs, or to the engine or other machinery
furnished for any mill, distillery, or other manufactory unless furnished to the
owner of the land on which the same may be situated; and not to any contract
made with the tenant, except only to the extent of his interest.
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43-701 the lien may attach to ". . . the interest of the owner of the lot
or parcel of land . .. ,"' and under Section 43-702 it may attach ". . . to

the extent of all the right, title, and interest owned therein by the owner
thereof ..

."1

The word "owner" as used in these sections includes

any person who holds an estate or interest in the land.11 It is used as a
correlative of contractor or laborer. The prospective lienor, then, must
look at the property interests involved, and at the judicial interpretation
of the statute to find what "interest" of which "owner" he may attach
with a mechanic's lien.
There must be some property interest in the land to which the mechanic's lien can attach. If materials are furnished or labor performed
under contract with a trespasser or person on the land by mistake, no
lien may attach which will prejudice the rights of the true owner.12
Fee Simple, Life Estate, Term of Years. All estates in land, whether
legal or equitable, appear to be subject to attachment by mechanic's liens."
There is no distinction made by the statute between the various estatesthe only requirement is that the "owner" have some interest or estate in the
land which may be attached and sold. As regards a fee simple, the estate
would clearly be subject to a mechanic's lien for the owner's whole interest. The same would hold true of the life estate or the leaseholdthese interests could be attached and sold. In estates or intrests which
are less than a leasehold, such as those of the tenant at will, a practical
problem may exist as these lesser interests might not have a sufficient
sale value to cover the amount of the debt. This would not seem, under
the statute, to prevent their attachment by lien, but it should be noted
that no Indiana cases were found where such a lien was attempted.
Where a mechanic's lien is filed against less than a fee simple estate,
an important question for the lienor is whether he may attach only the
life estate or leasehold or may also attach the reversionary interest. If
the lienor may attach both interests he has, of course, more security for
his debt.
The general rule regarding the liability of the owner of a reversionary interest for mechanic's liens was stated in American Islam Society, Inc. v. Bob Ulrich Decorating,4 where the court said:
In order that a lien may attach to real estate for material used
9. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-701 (Burns 1952).
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-702 (Bums 1952).
11. See PHILLIPS, MECHANICS' LIENS §§ 65-71 (2d ed. 1893).
12. See 10 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 5192 (repl. 1957).
13. Fletcher Ave. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Roberts, 99 Ind. App. 391, 18 N.E. 794
(1934) ; 10 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 12, § 5199.
14. 126 Ind. App. 266, 132 N.E.2d 620 (1956).
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in a building erected thereon, it is necessary that such material
should be furnished by the authority and direction of the
owner, and something more than mere inactive consent on the
part of the owner is necessary in order that a lien may be
acquired against it. 5
The court goes on to note that, when a lease is involved, if the lease contemplates improvements by the lessee, the lessor's interest may be subject
to a mechanic's lien. This is especially applicable where the provision in
the lease authorizing the improvements states: that the lessee may deduct from the rent for improvements, that part of the consideration for
the lease is making improvements, or that the improvements made by
the lessee will revert to the lessor."8
Therefore, if the lienor wishes to attach the reversionary interest, he
must show either: (1) that the materials were furnished by the authority
and direction of the owner of the reversionary interest, and something
more than mere inactive consent on the part of this owner, or (2) that
the lease contemplated improvements by the lessee. This latter requirement is not necessarily separate and distinct from the former for if the
lease contemplated improvements in one of the ways mentioned above
this would appear to show both authority and direction and more than
mere inactive consent. Thus the lease could be considered as evidence
of the reversioner's authorization and direction and his consent.
The application of these rules or tests has not been uniform in Indiana. A lease in Abrams v. Silver contained a clause which said, "the
tenant is hereby granted the right, and agrees, to change the front of the
premises herein mentioned ..
"17
After the building was remodeled,
the lessee assigned his lease to the lienor as security for the improvements
made, and the lessor consented to the assignment. When the lienor
brought his action on a mechanic's lien filed against the lessor's interest,
the Indiana Appellate Court held that the lien failed since it did not meet
the test of authority and direction, and more than mere inactive consent
by the lessor. No mention was made of the provision in the lease which
stipulated that the front of the premises were to be changed (other than
quoting it in the statement of facts), or of any effect it would have had
on the outcome. Eleven years earlier the Indiana Appellate Court in
another case where the lease required improvements," upheld the lien
15. Id. at 270, 132 N.E.2d at 622; see e.g., Snelling v. Wortman, Receiver, 107 Ind.
App. 442, 24 N.E. 791 (1940) ; Abrams v. Silver, 102 Ind. App. 97, 1 N.E.2d 286 (1936).
16. Mancourt v. Wissel, 83 Ind. App. 313, 146 N.E. 423 (1925); Rader v. A.J.
Barrett Co., 59 Ind. App. 27, 108 N.E. 883 (1915).
17. 102 Ind. App. 97, 98, 1 N.E.2d 286 (1936).
18. Mancourt v. Wissel, 83 Ind. App. 313, 146 N.E. 423 (1925).
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saying that the rule regarding leases which contemplate improvements by
the lessee had been in effect in Indiana since the 1915 case of Rader v.
Barnett Co." Confusion over the application of these rules or whether
the court will look to the lease for evidence of authorization and consent
may have been settled by the 1956 decision in American Islam Society,
Inc. v. Bob Ulrich Decorating." Here the lease contemplated improvements, and the court in upholding a mechanic's lien on the lessor's interest said that it would look to the lease for evidence of the lessor's
consent.
Another important question, when dealing with less than a fee
simple estate, is the effect of surrender or forfeiture by the holder of the
lesser interest. The statute makes an effort to meet this problem when
a lease is involved by stating that so far as concerns buildings erected by
the lienholder, the forfeiture of the lease for rent will not impair the
lien.2 ' The lienor can have the buildings sold and removed. After a
mechanic's lien has attached to an interest, the general rule is that neither
voluntary surrender 2 nor forfeiture" will destroy it. In such a situation
the lessor must either (1) pay the debt and extinguish the lien, or (2) accept the purchaser as a tenant when the leasehold is sold.' 4 The new
tenant, however, is subject to all the terms of the lease."
In summary, the prospective lienor may attach the contractor's interest in the land, and any property interest is sufficient under the statute.
The lienor may also attach the reversionary interest if he can show that
the labor or materials were furnished by the reversioner's authority and
direction, and with more than his mere inactive consent. When a lease
is involved the lessor's interest may be attached if the lease contemplated
improvements by the lessee. Once the lien has attached, voluntary surrender or forfeiture will not destroy it.
Co-tenancies-Tenantsby the Entireties, Joint Tenants, Tenants-inCommon. The right to a mechanic's lien as a result of a contract with a
co-tenant may depend upon the nature of the co-tenancy. A joint tenant
or tenant-in-common both hold undivided shares in land which may be
alienated or forfeited." There is an interest in the land which can be
attached and sold without seriously impairing the ownership or rights of
19. 59 Ind. App. 27, 108 N.E. 883 (1915).
20.

126 Ind. App. 266, 132 N.E.2d 620 (1956).

21.

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 43-702 (Bums 1952).

22. McAnally v. Glidden, Receiver, 30 Ind. App. 22, 65 N.E. 291 (1902).
23. Montpelier Light Co. v. Stevenson, 22 Ind. App. 175, 53 N.E. 444 (1899).

24.

PHILLIPS,

MECHANICS'

LIENS

§ 191-92 (3d ed. 1893); See McAnally v.

Glidden, Receiver, 30 Ind. App. 22, 65 N.E. 291 (1902).

25. ibid.
26. See 2

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

§§ 425, 428 (1939).
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the co-tenants.
In estates by entireties, however, both husband and wife are seized
of the whole estate." The interest in the land is held by a unit which in
turn holds the entire estate in the land. The result is that neither husband nor wife can impair the estate with their individual debts.2" The
prospective lienor who contracts with the husband cannot have a lien on
the husband's interest in the land-the lien must attach to the whole
estate or not at all.2"
Realizing this basic difference between estates by entireties and
other forms of co-ownership of land, it is surprising that the Indiana
courts apply the same rules of law in all co-tenancy problems. In Mann
v. Schnarr2 a brother and sister held land as tenants-in-common. The
brother made the contract for the improvements, and although the sister
objected to the cost, she signed several partial payments checks. The
court held that if the co-tenant knows the improvement is being made
and makes no objection, and does any affirmative act consistent with
consent, the co-tenant's interest is subject to a mechanic's lien. Here the
objections to the cost showed knowledge, and the partial payment checks
showed consent, and hence the sister's interest was subject to the lien.
In Means v. Everitt,1 a 1960 decision concerning a mechanic's lien
2 as
filed against an estate by entireties, the court cited Mann v. Schnarr"
controlling and said the lienor must show that the co-tenant (1) had
knowledge that the improvements were being made, (2) made no objection to those providing the material and labor, and (3) performed any
act consistent with consent. This seems almost to require that once the
co-tenant has knowledge that his co-tenant is improving the land, he
must take affirmative action to prevent his interest from being subjected
to a mechanic's lien. Clearly the second requirement-objection to those
providing the labor and materials-calls for an affirmative act. But
assuming the co-tenant has knowledge of the improvements, and makes
no objection to the prospective lienors, his interest is still safe if no affirmative act consistent with consent is performed. The difficulty with
the third requirement is that the Means opinion implies that very little is
needed to show an affirmative act consistent with consent. The mere
fact that the co-tenant's interest is benefited may be enough. 2 If this is
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. § 430.
Id. § 434.
Ibid.
228 Ind. 654, 95 N.E.2d 138 (1950).

31. 167 N.E.2d 885 (1960).

32. 228 Ind. 654, 95 N.E.2d 138 (1950).
33. See Taggart v. Kern, 22 Ind. App. 271, 53 N.E. 651 (1898).
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true, the requirement of showing consent has little or no value, and affirmative action on the part of co-tenants is necessary to protect their
interests.
This is not to imply that such a rule is inequitable when a tenancy
by the entireties is involved; but it would seem to be inequitable when
joint tenants or tenants-in-common are involved. The relationship of
husband and wife and the peculiar nature of estates by entireties could
be held to be such that the one tenant should be required to take af firmative action if he disapproves of known improvements being made by the
other tenant. But it does not necessarily follow that a joint tenant or
tenant-in-common, upon discovering an improvement, should be required
to object to those providing the labor and materials, or face the risk of
having his interest in the land attached and sold if the contracting co34
tenant does not pay.

This problem is not easily solved. One reason is that it is not necessarily the nature of the estate that produces the inequity, but rather the
relationship of the tenants. A sharper distinction among the estates
would not necessarily help as husband and wife may hold land as jointBut since only husband and wife may
tenants or tenants-in-common.
hold as tenants by the entireties in Indiana,36 a step in the right direction
might be to require a lesser degree of consent in estates by entireties cases.
The resulting requirement of more evidence to show consent when jointtenants or tenants-in-common are involved could be tempered by the court
depending upon the relationship of the parties.
Under the current position of the Indiana courts, however, it is not
difficult for the lienor to attach the interest of all the co-tenants regardless of the nature of the estate they hold. All the lienor must show is
that the other co-tenants had knowledge of the improvements, made no
objection to those providing the material and labor, and performed any
act consistent with consent.
Vendor-Vendee. A vendee in possession of land under a contract
of purchase often makes valuable improvements before the actual conveyance of title. When this happens the materialman or mechanic who
provided the material or labor may face the problem of whose interest
he may attach as security for his debt-may he file his lien against only
the contracting vendee, or may he also attach the interest of the vendor?
The rule stated by Indiana courts is that a vendee in possession
34. This assumes that the requirement of an affirmative act consistent with consent is fulfilled by the co-tenants interest being benefited by the improvements.

35. 2
36.

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§

425, 428 (1939).

See Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. O'Brien, 142 Ind. 218, 41 N.E. 528 (1895).
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under a contract to purchase cannot cloud the vendor's title by causing
mechanic's liens to be filed against the land." There is an exception to
this general rule, however, where the vendor was instrumental and active in having the improvements or repairs made."3 Here again the basic
test is were the materials and labor furnished by the authority and direction of the owner (vendor), and something more than mere inactive consent on his part shown." In applying this test the court will look to the
contract of purchase to see if the improvements were required, and if so
then active consent is shown, and a mechanic's lien will probably attach.4"
In Rader v. A. J. Barrett Co., 4 the contract required the vendee to
expend $500 to improve the property within sixty days of the contract
date. If the conveyance was not finally consummated this sum was to be
forfeited. The vendee made the improvements, but failed to meet other
conditions in the contract and the contract was forfeited. A lien against
the vendor was upheld, the court saying that the contract showed authorization and more than mere inactive consent. In National Brick Co. v.
Russell,42 the Rader case was distinguished as there was no allegation that
the vendor required more security than the bare real estate itself. In the
Rader case the improvements were required to better the vendor's security if the conveyance was not consummated. Thus, the fact that the
improvements required are for the immediate use and benefit of the
vendor may show sufficient consent for a mechanic's lien to attach.
It should be noted here that there is an important and major difference between the position of the prospective lienor when dealing with
a vendee and when dealing with a lessee or tenant. As stated earlier,
under section 43-702 of the statute,43 if a lienor erects a building for a
lessee and the interest is forfeited for rent, the lienor can foreclose on
the building itself-he may have it sold and removed. Although the
court has generally extended this to all tenants, it does not include a
vendee in possession under a contract of purchase.4 4 There appears to
be no reason for this difference in remedy other than that the legislature
omitted it in the statute. This fact was pointed out by the court in
37. Robert Hixon Lumber Co. v. Rowe, 83 Ind. App. 508, 149 N.E. 92 (1925);

Rader v. A. J. Barrett Co., 59 Ind. App. 27, 108 N.E. 883 (1915).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Holland v. Farrier, 75 Ind. App. 368, 130 N.E. 823 (1920).
Robert Hixon Lumber Co. v. Rowe, 83 Ind. App. 508, 149 N.E. 92 (1925).
Rader v. A. J. Barrett Co., 59 Ind. App. 27, 108 N.E. 883 (1915).
Ibid.
99 Ind. App. 53, 190 N.E. 614 (1934).
INh.Ai N. STAT. § 43-702 (Burns 1952).
44. Davis v. Elliot, 7 Ind. App. 246, 34 N.E. 591 (1893); accord, United States
Lumber & Supply v. River Park Improvement Co., 85 Ind. App. 140, 151 N.E. 354
(1926); Robert Hixon Lumber Co. v. Rowe, 83 Ind. App. 508, 149 N.E. 92 (1925);
Toner v. Whygrew, 50 Ind. App. 387, 98 N.E. 450 (1912).
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"Davisv. Elliot"5 sixteen years before the 1909 statute was enacted, but
was not corrected by the legislature. Thus, the prospective lienor who
erects a building for a vendee in possession of land under a contract of
purchase cannot have a mechanic's lien on the building, and cannot have a
lien against the real estate itself unless he can show that the materials and
,labor Were furnished by the authority and direction of the owner
(vendor), and something more than mere inactive consent on his part.
If the lienor can show that the possessor is a tenant, however, he may
have a lien on the building."
The question of whether the contractor is a tenant or a vendee could
present an interesting problem when a lease with an option to purchase
is involved. The position of the Indiana courts is that a mere option to
purchase does not vest any title in the holders until the option has been
exercised."
In other words until the option is exercised the holder is a
tenant. The difficulty is that many conditional sale of land contracts
are written in the form of leases with an option to purchase. Under
such an instrument the holder, on the basis of form, would be a tenant
while the parties actually contemplated a sale of the land. Whether the
courts will look through the form to the intent of the parties does not
appear to be settled. The better view would probably be to classify the
parties according to the true nature of the transaction.
Regardless of whether the contractor is considered a tenant or a
vendee, the mechanic or materialman should have a remedy. If the contractor is held to be a lessee the mechanic can have a lien on the leasehold
as discussed earlier. If the contractor is held to be a vendee, the mechanic can attach his lien to the vendee's interest in the land. The statute
requires only that the contractor have an interest in the land, and under
the doctrine of equitable conversion the vendee holds an equitable interest
in the land from the moment the contract of purchase is consummated.
The value of this interest would probably vary considerably, but it could
be attached by a mechanic's lien.
There seems to be little doubt, however, that the prospective lienor
is at a disadvantage when dealing with a vendee. This is shown in
Toner v. Whybrew4 s where the contract of purchase said the vendee was
not required to make payments on the principal during years when the
vendee constructed buildings on the land, the cost of which was equal to
the due payments. In such a situation the payments would be extended
45.
46.
47.
48.

7 Ind. App. 246, 34 N.E. 591 (1893).
See also Holland v. Farrier, 75 Ind. App. 368, 130 N.E. 823 (1920).
Koehring v. Bowman, 194 Ind. 433, 142 N.E. 117 (1924).
50 Ind. App. 387, 90 N.E. 450 (1911).
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one year. The vendee ordered a house constructed, and mechanic's liens
were filed against both the house and the real estate. The vendee then
surrendered possession to the vendor. The court held that as Section
4.3-702 of the statute49 does not apply to vendees the lien against the
house was not valid. In Robert Hixon Lumber Co. v. Rowe,5" the house

located on the land was destroyed by fire. The vendor gave the vendee
the insurance money to rebuild the house in consideration for a promissory note, which was to become void when the house was completed. The
house was rebuilt, a mechanic's lien filed against the real estate, and the
court held the lien invalid. During the same year the same court upheld
a mechanic's lien on the reversionary interest of a lessor where the lease
contemplated improvements."'
Much of the criticism of this situation should probably be directed at
the legislature, and its failure to allow mechanic's liens on buildings constructed for vendees as it does in cases involving lessees and mortgagors.
This inequity was pointed out by the court in 1893,2 yet the legislature
failed to remedy the situation under the 1909 statute or since that time.
Inclusion of vendees under the forfeiture clause of 43-702" would not
completely solve the problem, however, as the remedy of sale and removal of buildings has a practical limitation depending upon the size and
nature of the structure. It would be a step in the right direction, however.
Aside from this statutory condition there appears a hesitance on the
part of the courts to equate the remedy applied in cases involving lessees
and co-tenants to that applied when vendees are involved. There is no
thought of unjust enrichment to the vendor as there is in cases of lessors
or co-tenants; and a comparison of the fact situations can easily leave the
impression that the lienor will have a more difficult task showing authorization, direction, and consent if he is foreclosing on a vendee, than if he
is foreclosing on a lessor or a co-tenant. 4
Thus, under the Indiana mechanic's lien statute, a lien may attach to
all the right, title, and interest of the "owner" of the land, and, any interest in land is sufficient to support the lien. Under the statute when a
building is erected for a lessee or tenant, forfeiture of the interest for
failure to pay rent will not impair the lien, and it may be foreclosed on
IN . ANN. STAT. § 43-702 (Burns 1952).
50. 83 Ind. App. 508, 149 N.E. 92 (1925).
51. Mancourt v. Wissel, 83 Ind. App. 313, 146 N.E. 423 (1925).
52. Davis v. Elliott, 7 Ind. App. 246, 34 N.E. 591 (1893).
53. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-702 (Burns 1952).
54. Compare Toner v. Whygrew, 50 Ind. App. 387, 90 N.E. 450 (1911); and
Robert Hixon Lumber Co. v. Rowe, 83 Ind. App. 508, 149 N.E. 92 (1925) with Mann v.
Schnarr, 228 Ind. 654, 95 N.E.2d 138 (1950) and Mancourt v. Wissel, 83 Ind. App. 313,
146 N.E. 423 (1925).
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the building itself. The materialman or mechanic may also have a lien
on the reversionary interest or the interest of a co-tenant or vendor if the
lienor can show that the materials and labor were furnished by the authority and direction of the owner (reversioner, co-tenant, vendor), and
something more than mere inactive consent on his part. The court may
look to the instrument conveying the interest for evidence of authorization and active consent. Although these rules are applied generally, the
fact situations necessary to support the lien may vary depending upon
whether the lienor is dealing with a lessee, a co-tenant, or a vendee.
II
THE REAL ESTATE TO WHICH A MECHANIC'S LIEN
MAY ATTACH (EXTENT OF THE LIEN)
Once having determined that the debtor has an attachable interest
in the land, the next matter that must be considered is the amount of real
estate that the creditor may attach to insure the satisfaction of the debt.
Although the current statute sets out in Section 43-701"5 that a mechanic's
lien may be had ". . . separately or jointly upon the house, . . . or other
structure . . . and, on the interest of the owner of the lot or parcel of
land on which it stands or with which it is connected . . .," and in Sec-

tion 43-7026" that "The entire land upon which any such building, erection, or other improvement is situated, including that portion not covered
therewith, shall be subject to the lien.

.

.

."

this does not completely

solve the problems that could arise under the statute.
Reference to judicial construction of the statute may also prove to
be of little assistance. In fact, most of the opinions on mechanic's liens
fail to mention that a mechanic's lien statute exists. A major source of
confusion is that the courts often cite and approve decisions under the
two earlier mechanic's lien statutes-those of 1853"r and 1883.68 Perhaps the citing of cases under the 1883 statute is valid as this statute is
very similar to the current statute, especially concerning the extent of
liens. Section 43-7026" of the current statute is a word-for-word reenactment of Section 260 of the 1883 statute. The 1853 statute, however, is not similar to either the 1883 or the 1909 statutes; yet, many of
the decisions under the 1883 statute rely upon the earlier opinions ren55.
56.

57.
58.
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dered under the 1853 statute. The problem becomes more complex when
decisions under the current statute (1909) rely upon decisions under the
1883 statute, but reject the earlier decisions under the 1853 statute. It
is complex because the 1883 decisions relied upon claim to be in harmony
with the 1853 decisions. The total result is that there appears to be both
reliance on and rejection of earlier judicial decisions without regard to
either the statute now in force or the statute in force when the decision
was rendered.
It is true that under some fact situations the statute adequately
covers the subject, but under others neither the statute nor the prior decisions will be of much help. To facilitate examination of this area it
might be best to first examine situations where there can be no doubt
that the lien would attach and as to how much real estate may be attached,
and then move on to those problem areas where it is questionable whether
the lien is valid and how much real estate may be attached.
A Mechanic's Lien upon One Building and the Lot or Parcelof Land
on. which it is Located. In this classic situation there would appear to be
little doubt of the validity of the lien. The owner of a lot or parcel of
land contracts for the erection or improvement of a structure, a lien is
filed, and if the debt is not paid the mechanic may foreclose the lien. The
lien will attach to the interest the owner holds in the land and the amount
of real estate attached would be the lot or parcel on which the structure
stands-the entire land, including that portion not covered by the structure. There appear to be no cases where such liens were held improper
as to the extent of the property attached."'
A Mechanic's Lien Filed upon Two or More Buildings and the One
Lot or Parcelon which. They are Located. Under the 185362 statute such
a lien would probably have been invalid."3 The court interpreted this
early statute as contemplating only a single lien on a single building, not
a joint lien on several buildings. This view was based upon the theory
that each building was security for itself-that the credit was given for
the identical building for which the material or labor were furnished.64
The only situation where a joint lien could be filed upon several buildings
was where they were all erected at the same time, and without a spacing
interval between them since then they could be considered as one
building."2
61. See generally Crawfordsville v. Barr, 65 Ind. 367 (1879).
62. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, part second, ch. 1 §§ 647-48 at 181.
63. Hill v. Braden, 54 Ind. 72 (1876) ; McGrew v. McCarty, 78 Ind. 496 (1881);
Wilkerson v. Rust, 57 Ind. 172 (1877).
64. McGrew v. McCarty, 78 Ind. 496 (1881).

65. Ibid.
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The decisions under the 1883 statute,6" however, have not entirely
followed this view. In Premier Steel Co. v. McElwaine-Richards Co."
the land owner used the argument of separate and distinct buildings to no
avail. Here the prospective lienor had supplied steam, gas, and water
pipes for use in several buildings, and the Indiana Supreme Court, citing
JONES ON LIENS, said, "Where the labor is performed or materials fur-

nished under one contract upon several buildings, all situate upon one
lot of land belonging to the contracting owner, the lien attaches to all the
land for the whole value of the labor performed. . ..
"
PremierSteel is probably still good law in Indiana today. As stated
earlier, the 1883 statute and the current statute are very similar with regard to the extent of the lien. Also, the courts now uphold a lien on two
or more buildings even though the lienor has erected or improved less
than all the buildings."5 This position, which will be more fully discussed immediately below, appears a fortiori to affirm the position of the
courts.

A Mechanic's Lien filed upon Two or More Buildings on a Single
Lot or Parcel of Land, the Lienor Having Erected or Improved Less
Than All the Buildings. From the above discussion it seems obvious that
if the courts under the 1853 statute 0 would not accept a lien on two or
more buildings when they were all erected or improved by the lienor,
they would not have accepted a mechanic's lien where the lienor erected
or improvd less than all the buildings.
This precise issue does not seem to have been raised under the 1883
statute." The court in the Premier Steel case made it clear that they
were not passing on such a problem stating, "We have no occasion to discuss here the rule with reference to the improvement of one of a number
of buildings upon a large tract of land ... . ""' The question was, however, placed squarely before the court under the 1909 statute in Judah v.
F. H. Cheyne Electric Co.7 This case involved a triangular shaped parcel of land occupied by three separate and distinct buldings all erected at
different times. The labor and materials for which the lien was filed was
66. Ind. Laws 1883, ch. CXV, §§ 1-2 at 140, as amended, Ind. Laws 1889, ch.
CXXIII, §§ 1-2 at 257.
67. 144 Ind. 614, 43 N.E. 876 (1895).
68. See 2 JONES, MECHIANICS' LIENS § 1313 (3d ed. 1894).
69. See Judah v. F. H. Cheyne Electric Co., 53 Ind. App. 476, 101 N.E. 1039 (1913).
70. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, part second, ch. 1 §§ 647-48 at 181.
71. Ind. Laws 1883, ch. CXV, §§ 1-2 at 140, as amended, Ind. Laws 1889, ch.

CXXIII, §§ 1-2 at 257.
72. Premier Steel Co. v. McElwaine-Richards Co., 144 Ind. 614, 618, 43 N.E. 876,
877 (1895).
73. 53 Ind. App. 476, 101 N.E. 1039 (1913).
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provided for two of the buildings, while no work or labor was furnished
to the third building located at the northernmost part of the lot. The
appellant owner contended that as the buildings were separate and distinct and no labor or materials were furnished for one of the buildings,
the lien on the real estate was not valid. The court rejected this position
saying that it was sufficient if the labor or materials went into a building
or buildings on an undivided parcel of land. Great stress was given to
Section 43-701 which provides for the lien on the lot or parcel of land
on which the structure stands ".

.

. or with which it is connected"

;4

and Section 43-702 which provides for a lien upon the entire land,
including the portion not covered therewith. .

.

. ""

It is im-

portant to note that the court hastened to add that if the owner had subdivided the lot or parcel of land before erecting the buildings, the court
could possibly be justified in restricting the lien to the applicable subdivision.
One Mechanic's Lien Filed upon Two or More Buildings and the
Contiguous Lots or Parcels of Land on which they are Located. For
such a lien to have been valid under the 1853 statute,"6 the lienor would
probably have had to show that the buildings were one integral unit. In
Hill v. Braden" one lien was filed for the construction of seven cottages
on four contiguous lots. The cottages were separated by about four to
six feet. The lien was not allowed, the court saying that the statute
contemplated only liens upon separate pieces of property. The court
noted, however, that joint liens were sometimes allowed where the several
buildings were actually constructed under one roof with no open spaces of
ground between them. In other words, under the 1853 statute, any interval, however small, would prevent the whole from being one continuous structure, and would require more than one lien.
A major decision under the 18838 statute was Premier Steel Co. v.
McElwaize-Richards Co.," which was discussed earlier. The lienor had
supplied gas, steam, and water pipes to several buildings located on what
the court called a "small tract" of land within the Indianapolis city limits.
Although the issue to which the court directed itself was whether one
lien would suffice for all the buildings, the court cited with approval
0 a District
Phillips v. Gilbert,"
of Columbia case, which upheld one lien
74. IND. ANN.
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§ 43-701 (Burns 1952).

75. IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-702 (Burns 1952).
76. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1852, part second, ch. 1 §§ 647-48 at 181.
77. Hill v. Braden, 54 Ind. 72 (1876).

78. Ind. Laws 1883, ch. CXV, §§ 1-2 at 140, as amended, Ind. Laws 1889, ch.
CXXIII, §§ 1-2 at 257.
79. 144 Ind. 614, 43 N.E. 876 (1895).
80. 101 U.S. 721 (1879).
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filed on six houses built on six contiguous lots. The emphasis in the
Phillips case was on the contract-"The contract was one and related to
the row as an entirety, and not to the particular buildings separately.
The whole was a building, within the meaning of the law, from having
been united by the parties in one contract as one general piece of work.""s
In considering how valuable the Premier Steel decision is in interpreting the statute one important factor must be kept in mind. The real
issue before the court was whether one lien could suffice for labor and
materials furnished to several distinct buildings. Although there were
undoubtedly several lots involved, there was no mention of this or discussion of any effect it could have. The decision is of value because it
shows that one lien was upheld on more than one lot of land, even though
this issue was not in controversy.
2 decided under the 1909 statute, 3 is probably the
West v. Dreher,"
leading case on contiguous lots. Dreher had two separate dwelling houses
constructed, one house on each of two contiguous lots. A mechanic's
lien was filed, and the court held that a contractor who, under a single
contract, furnishes materials and performs labor in the construction of
two separate dwelling houses, one house on each of two contiguous lots,
the labor and material having gone indiscriminately in both houses, may
by a single notice have a lien on both houses and lots.
4 case,
In reaching this decision, the court relied upon the Phillips"
and three earlier Indiana decisions-PremierSteel Co. v. McElwaineRichards Co., 5 Windfall Natural Gas Co. v. Roe,"8 and Judah v. J. H.
Cheyne Electric Co. 7 The only mention of the statute is (1) that the
case must be decided under what is now Section 43-701, and (2) that
the Indiana statute is similar to that of the District of Columbia. There
is no discussion of the Indiana statute in general or of what language in
43-701 is involved. It is in looking at the court's foundation for the
West decision in relation to the applicable statutory language that a good
example is found of what was described earlier as ". . . both reliance
on and rejection of earlier judicial decisions without regard to either the
statute now in force or the statute in force when the decision was
rendered."
The mechanic's lien statute under which the Phillips decision was
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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rendered was enacted by Congress in 1859." It is similar to the Indiana
statute in that Section One states that the lienor may ". . . have a lien
upon such building and the lot of ground on which the same is situated. . .. "" It is dissimilar as this phrase is qualified by Section Eight
which says that if the building is outside of Washington City or Georgetown the ". . . land upon which the same is erected, together with the
space around the same not exceeding 500 square feet . . ." is subject to
the lien; and if the building is in Washington or Georgetown ". . . the
ground on which the same is erected and a space of ground equal to the
front of the building, and extending to the depth of the lot or lots on
which it is erected . . ." shall be subject to the lien." While at first
glance, the statute may appear to be similar to the Indiana statute, actually
the Congress had a great deal more to say about how much land could be
attached by lien than the Indiana legislature did. The Washington, D. C.
statute prescribed the amount of land which could be attached. The
Indiana statute says only that a lien may be had upon the structure and
the lot or parcel on which it stands or with which it is connected.
The major basis in Indiana law for the West decision was the
Premier Steel 1 case. As was mentioned earlier this case involved one
lien filed on buildings located on more than one lot, but the court did not
take this into consideration in reaching its decision. In fact the court
cited a much earlier Indiana case to the effect that "If the work be done
or materials furnished upon distinct premises, the lien must be against
each of the several premises, according to the value of the work and
materials incorporated in each, and not against both for the aggregate
amount." 2
The Windfall NaturalGas Co.93 case did not involve material or labor
furnished to contiguous lots. In this case all the work was performed
on one lot, but the lienor filed upon three lots since he was not certain on
which lot he had worked. The lien was not valid, for other reasons, but
the court said, "A joint lien may be had upon a number of structures,
where they are built or repaired under a single contract and are thus
connected in construction and ownership."94 Three cases were relied
upon for this position-the Premier Steel95 case, Hill v. Braden,96 and
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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Wilkerson v. Rust."' This is interesting as the appellee in the West case
attempted to rely upon the Hill and Wilkerson decisions, but the court distinguished them on the facts, and said the PremierSteel case was the better view. All this presents the anomalous situation of the West court refusing the tenor of the Hill and Wilkerson decisions, and accepting the
Windfall Natural Gas decision which was based upon Hill and Wilkerson.
In other words the Windfall NaturalGas opinion cites PremierSteel, Wilkerson, and Hill for the same proposition, while the West opinion accepts
Premier Steel and Windfall Natural Gas, but rejects Hill and Wilkerson
implying that they state opposing propositions.
The third Indiana case used to support the West decision was Judah
v. J. H. Cheyne Electric Co."8 In this case, which was also discussed
earlier, the court said that one lien was sufficient if labor or materials
went into a building or buildings on an undivided parcel of land. Here
again the issue of contiguous lots was not before the court, and after
stating the holding the court added that if the owner had subdivided the
lot or parcel of land before erecting the buildings, the liens could possibly be restricted to the applicable subdivisions. What is meant by
"subdividing" is not clear, but it could be assumed that it meant platting
the land.
Despite any difficulty in understanding the rationale of the court in
the West case, there is little doubt that today in Indiana one lien will suffice for work or materials furnished to structures on contiguous lots.
There is still one further point to be considered, however-that of the
court's interpretation of the statutory language, "...
structure) stands or with which it is connected ....

on which it (the
,9 Understanding

this is important in attempting to project the court's views to future cases
where the factual situation differs from the West case. Perhaps it would
be best to suggest several feasible interpretations of this language, and
then attempt to determine how the West decision utilized this language.
One possible interpretation would be that a lien could be had on the
lot or parcel on which the structure stands plus land which is physically
connected; for example, a contiguous lot. Such an interpretation would
certainly add to the lienor's security if the contracting owner held more
than the lot or parcel upon which the structure was situated. One of the
problems of accepting this interpretation is that of deciding how much
real estate the lienor may include in his claim and still be attaching "connected" land. If the owner holds an entire city block and the lienor
97. 57 Ind. 172 (1877).
98. 53 Ind. App. 476, 101 N.E. 1039 (1913).
99.
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erects a structure on a corner lot, how much of the block may he attach?
Another difficulty with this interpretation is the minimum contact which
will cause land to be considered as "connected."
Will one square foot
of land adjoining the lot on which the structure is situated suffice to
bind neighboring land? Would an easement be capable of providing a
sufficient physical connection to allow attachment of nearby land? These
are questions which are not easily answered yet their solution would be
necessary if a strictly physical interpretation of the word "connected"
were adopted.
Another interpretation of this language involves use of the conjunction "or." This interpretation would be that a lien may be had upon the
lot or parcel on which the structure stands OR the lot or parcel with
which it is connected. To follow this view and hold that the lienor must
elect which real estate he is attaching would not seem to make much
sense. Even if the "or" is used in the inclusive sense-if it said the
lien could attach to the lot or parcel on which the structure stands AND
connecting lots or parcels-the result is not necessarily that under a fact
situation such as the West case, i.e., two houses erected, one on each of
two contiguous lots, that one lien would suffice for both houses and lots.
This is true because the lienor would then be alleging that the total cost
of both houses was expended on one house, and the statute says that lien
is to be filed upon the lot or parcel "...
on which it stands ...
" (Emphasis added.)
A third interpretation could be based upon reading Section 43-7011..
as a whole. The first part of this section is devoted to a listing of things
for which a mechanic's lien may be filed. Generally this listing can be
divided into two classes-structures, i.e., buildings, mills, houses, etc., and
non-structures, i.e., sidewalks, drains, sewers, etc. It would not appear to
be doing violence to the drafting to conclude that the phrase ". . . ol
which it stands.
." refers to the first class-structures-and the
phrase "...
with which it is connected . . ." refers to the second
class-non-structure. If this is the true interpretation, Section 43-701
has nothing to say about the contiguous lot problem of the West case.
Mention should also be made here of that portion of Section 43-702
which states, "The entire land upon which any such building, erection,
or other improvement is situated, including that portion not covered
therewith, shall be subject to the lien. . . ."0
This section was not
mentioned in the West decision, and it probably is of little aid to our
problem. It is not clear just how much land is included in the "entire
100.
101.
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land," but the section would seem to mean only that the mechanic's lien
is not limited to the physical area which the structure covers.
The court, in the West case, seems to have favored the first interpretation discussed here-that of the word "connected" meaning physical
connection. Physical connection alone, however, may not be sufficient. '
Two additional "connections" are required: (1) that the labor and materials be furnished under a single contract and (2) that the labor and
materials are used indiscriminately in the construction of both houses.
The former "connection" appears to be the more critical. Great emphasis is placed on the court's statement in the Phillips opinion that "The
whole row was a building, within the meaning of the law, from having
been united by the parties in one contract, as one general piece of
work." °2 This implies that the parties must provide a "connection" by
the use of a single contract. In fact, the full implication seems to be that
it is the parties and the contract which are of primary importance, not the
fact that the lots are contiguous.
In evaluating the West decision, it must be remembered that as the
court does require some form of a physical "connection" it also adopts
the many problems that accompany such an interpretation. The problems of the minimum contact necessary to bind neighboring land, and
the maximum amount of real estate which can be attached will be difficult
to solve. It remains to be seen just how the courts will use the West decision. It is possible that greater emphasis will be given to the contract
and less to the actual physical connection of the land. Under the West
and Premier Steel decisions there is certainly sufficient latitude to expand the remedial characteristics of the mechanic's lien statute.
One Mechanic's Lien Filed upon One or More Buildings Located upon Non-Contiguous Lots. Under the 1853 statute0 3 a mechanic's lien
filed upon non-contiguous lots or parcels of land would not have been
valid. In McGrew v. McCarty, °4 the lienor filed a joint lien upon three
distinct parcels of land. The court, in striking down the lien, said that a
joint lien against separate houses on different streets, or on different
sides of a street, or even on the same side of the street is a nullity.
There appear to have been no cases involving non-contiguous lots
under either the 188305 or the 1909..6 statutes. Consequently, there is
a general belief that today such liens would not be honored by the
102.
103.
104.
105.
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courts. '
Although this may be true, there is some evidence that if the
courts had to face the problem again, the decision might be different.
With the passage of the 1883 statute and the 1909 statute, the courts
have not hesitated to expand the remedy of the mechanic's lien. Under
the 185308 statute the materialman or mechanic had to file a separate lien
for each building erected or repaired, and for each lot or parcel of land
where work was performed. As discussed earlier, this procedure of filing several liens is no longer necessary. By utilizing the tenor of the
West decision it would appear that a substantial argument could be made
for allowing liens on non-contiguous lots or parcels providing (1) the
labor and material was furnished under one contract, and (2) the labor
and materials were used indiscriminately on both lots or parcels of land.
Premier Steel' and the Judah'1 0 case would also lend support since in
both of these cases the court did not seem to be concerned with the fact
that more than one lot was involved. This position should have merit
especially in view of the court's repeated declaration that although the
statute must be strictly construed as to who is entitled to mechanic's
liens, it should be liberally construed in favor of those entitled to its
benefits.111 If one lien will be upheld on two contiguous lots, why should
a lien be voided if the two lots are separated by a third-provided labor
or materials are furnished to each lot attached.
The major roadblock to recoguizing mechanic's liens on noncontiguous lots is the interpretation of the phrase ". . . with which it is
,"2as requiring some type of physical connection. So
connected..
long as this interpretation exists, liens on non-contiguous lots or parcels
will probably not be valid without legislative amendment. It is doubtful
that this question will be answered in the near future as it would be
foolish for a mechanic or materialman to risk losing his simple remedy
by filing one lien on non-contiguous lots or parcels when he can be certain of his remedy by filing a separate lien on each.
A Mechanic's Lien Filed for Repair or Constructionon an Easement.
Filing a mechanic's lien for labor or materials furnished on an easement
presents some interesting problems as to just what real estate may be
attached. Neither Section 43-701 or 43-702"' mention easements as
such, but many of the things listed in the former section could easily be
107.
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constructed upon easements-".

.

.

walk or sidewalk, whether such

walk or sidewalk be on the land or bordering thereon, stile, well, drain,
drainage ditch, sewer or cistern . . ."114
The mere listing of these
things would seem to imply that a valid lien could be had for labor or
materials furnished on an easement. Such an interpretation would also
seem to follow from the earlier discussion regarding the phrase ". . with
which it is connected. . .

."

The real difficulty arises when easements-

in-gross are involved-easements which are not "connected" to a dominant tenement.
Looking to the case law, the only decision
cifically with easements is Wells v. Christian."5
laid from the owner's main plant through an
streets. The lien was filed upon the main plant,
lien saying,

found which deals speHere steam pipes were
easement in the public
and the court upheld the

The work which appellant performed being directly and necessarily connected with the erection of appellee's heating system
.

.

.

it was immaterial whether such work was performed

upon the particular premises to which the labor lien primarily
attached, or upon the street in front of the same, or at some
point where the appellee owned merely an easement or were
operating under a license from the city." 6
This position is certainly broad enough so that prospective lienors should
not have to be concerned about a lack of remedy when providing labor or
materials to an easement. The fact that this decision was under the 1883
statute should not detract from its force. As noted earlier, the same
language was utilized by the legislature in both statutes concerning the
extent -ofmechanic's liens.
In final evaluation, it should be noted that since the first mechanic's
lien statutes appeared in the early 19th century, the area has undergone
constant growth. This remedy has been expanded greatly by both the
legislatures and courts so as to better correspond to the needs of our
industrial society. There is some evidence that the Indiana Mechanic's
Lien Statute may be altered again in the near future, as the 1961 General
Assembly directed the Legislative Advisory Commission to conduct a
detailed study of the current statute with a view to eliminating any injustices which now exist."'
114. INn. ANN. STAT. § 43-701 (Burns 1952).
115. 165 Ind. 662, 76 N.E. 518 (1906).
116. Id. at 665.
117. House Enrolled Concurrent Resolution No. 18, Ind. Gen. Assembly (1961).
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The main discussion in this note, however, has centered upon just
what is the status of portions of the current statute-how they operate
upon various fact patterns. The major problem encountered was probably the court's refusal to clearly interpret the statute. In some cases the
courts have ignored the statute's existence, while in others they have cited
it without explaining its impact on the results of the cases. Undoubtably,
legislative action might be necessary to correct present inequities, but
legislative action will be of little value unless it is implemented by the
courts. The majority of the problems discussed here could be solved
by the courts alone.

